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REFLECTIONS ON FULLER AND 
PERDUE'S THE RELIANCE 
INTEREST IN CONTRACT 
DAMAGES: A POSITIVE ECONOMIC 
FRAMEWORK 
Avery Katz* 
Fuller and Perdue's classic article, The Reliance Interest in 
Contract Damages, 1 is regarded by many contemporary con-
tracts scholars as the single most influential law review article in 
the field. For those of us who teach and think about contracts 
from the perspective of law and economics, 2 the consensus would 
probably be close to unanimous. The article displays an ap-
proach highly congenial to an economic perspective. The connec-
tion goes beyond Fuller and Perdue's explicitly functional ap-
proach to law (which law and economics shares with other 
schools of thought descended from the legal realists) and beyond 
Fuller and Perdue's focus on commercial policy. Fuller and Per-
due's analysis of the relationships among the various damage in-
terests they identify, and of the social purposes served by their 
protection, reveals a sophisticated understanding of the role and 
limits of economic incentives in influencing the behavior of con-
tractual parties. 
Fuller and Perdue's article made two major related claims. 
The first claim was primarily descriptive or positive: that com-
mon-law courts deciding contracts cases had actually been at-
tempting to protect people's reliance expenditures, notwith-
standing the fact that the doctrinal focus of the cases was often 
elsewhere, or that courts often claimed to be protecting people's 
expectations. The second claim was primarily normative: that 
the reliance interest, rather than the expectation interest, was 
the appropriate object of judicial protection. 
• Assistant Professor of Law and of Economics, University of Michigan. 
1. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE 
L.J. 52, 373 (1936). 
2. I will use the term "law and economics" to designate the school of thought, such 
that it is, that emphasizes the application of economic techniques and perspectives to 
the study of law. In the spirit of the modeling approach to social science, I will assume 
for the purposes of argument that such a categorization is useful. 
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It is the first claim on which this Article focuses. How was it 
possible for Fuller and Perdue to argue that the courts had re-
ally been protecting a different interest than everyone believed? 
The key to their explanation was a phenomenon they labeled as 
the divergence between measure and motive. 3 Because of the ec-
onomic relationship connecting the reliance interest to the other 
two theories of damages they identifie~, it was possible for 
courts to use a nonreliance theory as a measure or approxima-
tion of damages, while having as their real motive the protection 
of reliance. 
This Article will generalize the reasoning underlying this 
claim, and in so doing will outline a theoretical framework con-
necting all of the damage measures Fuller and Perdue discussed. 
The framework makes explicit the economic relationships among 
reliance, restitution, and expectati<;m that Fuller and Perdue dis-
cussed more intuitively. It also reveals that Fuller and Perdue's 
analysis suggests a fourth theory of damages they did not 
recognize. 
The relationship among the four damage principles means 
that any one of the four damage theories can be used, under the 
appropriate circumstances, as an approximate measure for the 
others. Thus, measure and motive can be uncoupled entirely. 
Whether the reliance interest is the most important or funda-
mental of the four interests is therefore a separate matter which 
I briefly discuss in the concluding section below. To the extent 
that the full logic of Fuller and Perdue's descriptive claim is ac-
cepted, though, their argument for the primacy of reliance may 
be subverted by future scholars using arguments similar to their 
own. 
I. CLASSIFYING DAMAGE MEASURES: THE MISSING REMEDY 
The three principles of contract damages that Fuller and Per-
due identified are familiar to all modern lawyers. Their defini-
tions appear in the Second Restatement of Contracts as an in-
troduction to the topic of damages.4 They are: (1) the 
expectation principle, which holds that damages following 
breach of contract should make the plaintiff as well off as he 
3. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 66. 
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981): "Purposes of remedies. Judi-
cial remedies under the rules stated in [the Restatement of Contracts] serve to protect 
one or more of the following interests of a promisee: (a) his 'expectation interest,' ... 
(b) his 'reliance interest,' ... or (c) his 'restitution interest' .... " 
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would have been had the defendant performed her promise;11 (2) 
the reliance principle, which holds that damages for breach 
should make the plaintiff as well off as he would have been had 
the promisor never made her promise; and (3) the restitution 
principle, which holds that damages for breach should require 
the defendant to return any benefit conferred on her by the 
plaintiff as a result of the promise. Fuller and Perdue's main 
thesis was that the reliance principle was central, notwithstand-
ing appearances to the contrary. 
The expectation principle was doctrinally dominant at the 
time Fuller and Perdue wrote and is still so today, especially for 
promises made in the course of commercial bargains.6 For the 
category of donative or non-bargain promises, however, the reli-
ance principle had gained substantial influence even by 1936 and 
is today predominant, due in no small part to the influence of 
the Fuller and Perdue analysis.7 The reliance principle is also 
commonly used today for promises made in the course of 
precontractual negotiation.8 Continuing (at some peril) to gener-
alize about prevailing doctrine, the restitution theory is applied 
chiefly in cases involving failed bargains, or where the plaintiff's 
contractual claims are vitiated by lack of some element of mu-
tual assent or proof thereof. A typical example would be an oral 
bargain covered by the Statute of Frauds. In many circum-
stances, how~ver, a promisee entitled to expectation may be per-
mitted to elect the restitution remedy instead, and recover "off 
the contract."9 
5. Throughout the essay, I adopt the convention of referring to plaintiffs as male and 
defendants as female. 
6. For transactions covered by the Uniform Commercial Code, for instance, U.C.C 
§ 1-106(1) (1987) provides that "[t)he remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally 
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if 
the other party had fully performed." Cf. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1987) (stating that principles 
of law and equity supplement the UCC unless displaced by particular provisions); § 2-
719 (dealing with contractual modification or limitation of remedies). 
7. Compare the changes in formulation of§ 90 made between the First and Second 
Restatements of Contracts. The competition between the reliance and expectation prin-
ciples as applied to donative promises in the 1930's is nicely illustrated by Williston's 
famous colloquy with the American Law Institute on the hypothetical case of Johnny 
and his uncle, reprinted in many contracts casebooks and discussed by Fuller & Perdue, 
supra note 1, at 64 n.14. 
8. See, e.g., Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Drennan v. Star Pav-
ing, 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 
N.W.2d 267 (1965). For a general discussion of liability for promises made during the 
course of precontractual negotiation, see Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Pre-
liminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 217 
(1987) 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1973). 
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Let us develop a theoretical framework to help organize and 
generalize the three principles. Specifically, it is possible to clas-
sify theories of damages along two dimensions. First, one can 
distinguish between promisee-based and promisor-based theo-
ries of recovery. Both expectation and reliance are promisee-
based in that both theories of recovery are based upon the as-
sumption that the object of contract damages is to place the dis-
appointed promisee at some appropriate level of welfare. I would 
argue that restitution is primarily promisor-based, and that it 
seeks to put the misbehaving promisor at some appropriate level 
of welfare. Fuller and Perdue cloud the issue somewhat, claim-
ing the essence of restitution lies in a nexus between the posi-
tions of the parties: 
[W]hat we have called the restitution interest unites two 
elements: (1) reliance by the promisee, (2) a resultant 
gain to the promisor. It may for some purposes be neces-
sary to separate these elements .... Generally, however, 
in the cases we shall be discussing, gain by the promisor 
will be accompanied by a corresponding and, so far as its 
legal measurement is concerned, identical loss to the 
promisee, so that for our purposes the most workable 
classification is one which presupposes in the restitution 
interest a correlation of promisor's gain and promisee's 
loss.10 
Though restitution and reliance overlap substantially in prac-
tice, conflating the two concepts suited Fuller and Perdue's ob-
ject of explaining the law of damages with the reliance principle 
alone. Separating the two elements, however, will help us to gen-
eralize the Fuller and Perdue framework. In any event, the claim 
that courts are using a promisor-based theory when they use the 
word "restitution" is less important to my argument than is the 
claim that a focus on the promisor is the distinguishing feature 
of the restitution principle. 
The second distinction I stress is between backward-looking 
and forward-looking theories of recovery. Backward-looking the-
ories find the criterion of distributional justice at some point in 
the past, before the liability-creating event; forward-looking the-
ories attempt to achieve a state of affairs that may never have 
existed before but that is now regarded as just, given the occur-
rence of the liability-creating event. Reliance is backward-look-
10. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 54-55 (emphasis in original). 
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ing in that it seeks to return the promisee to the status quo 
before the promise was made, and expectation is forward-
looking.11 
Into which of these two classes the restitution interest falls is 
not immediately obvious. The ordinary-language meaning of the 
word and its Latin root both suggest an act of restoring to some 
previous condition, for whatever that is worth as a guide to legal 
usage. If forced to choose, I would assert without proof that 
most legal discussions of restitution articulate the concept in 
primarily backward-looking terms; the reader is invited to con-
sult his or her own experience in this regard. Fuller and Perdue, 
who focus on unjust enrichment as the touchstone of restitution, 
clearly regard restitution as backward-looking; this is not sur-
prising given the close connection they draw between restitution 
and reliance. 
However one classifies the restitution interest in this taxon-
omy, the obvious conclusion is that there should be four theories 
of recovery, not just three. Each of the four theories corresponds 
to a choice from both the time-based and party-based classifica-
tions. Figure 1 illustrates the point. If one regards restitution as 
a backward-looking theory, there is no forward-looking prom-
isor-based theory in the Fuller and Perdue scheme. Alterna-
tively, the restitution concept can be fruitfully clarified by divid-
ing it into backward-looking and forward-looking versions. One 
















In passing from compensation for change of position to compensation for loss of 
expectancy we pass, to use Aristotle's terms again, from the realm of corrective 
justice to that of distributive justice. The law no longer seeks merely to heal a 
disturbed status quo, but to bring into being a new situation. 
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 56. 
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Admittedly, anyone who proposes a new system of classifica-
tion should be prepared to demonstrate that the system is actu-
ally useful and interesting, and not just another arbitrary 
scheme of description. I think the taxonomy of Figure 1 is inter-
esting because it is the one we have actually been using since 
Fuller and Perdue wrote their article, and perhaps before. In-
deed, the distinction between expectation and reliance is proba-
bly the clearest example of the distinction between forward- and 
backward-looking justifications. The distinction between defend-
ant- and plaintiff-based theories may be more familiar to mod-
ern lawyers in the context of tort law, where it tracks the dis-
tinction between deterrence and compensation, but as Fuller 
and Perdue admit, 12 it is the essence of restitution. The fact that 
Fuller and Perdue set up the two distinctions and yet did not 
notice the asymmetry caused by the lack of the fourth interest is 
itself enlightening. One possible explanation of the omission is 
that the missing remedy is itself evidence of the reliance theory's · 
primacy, like the dog that did not bark, and that Fuller and Per-
due intended that to be the case. In the schematic of Figure 1, 
both expectation and restitution are adjacent to the core concept 
of reliance, and each shares with reliance a critical feature. Al-
though expectation is forward-looking, its focus on the promisee 
makes it an adequate proxy for reliance under the right circum-
stances; similarly, restitution's backward-looking approach often 
makes it an adequate substitute for reliance despite its focus on 
the promisor. But a forward-looking promisor-based theory 
would lack either connection with reliance and hence would lack 
justification. 
Actually, the missing remedy has received, and on occasion 
continues to receive, consideration by some courts. One such 
prominent case is Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and Mining Co. 13 
In Peevyhouse, the defendant promised to restore plaintiffs' 
land to its original condition following strip-mining. Performing 
the promise would have cost the defendant $29,000 and would 
have nominally increased the market value of the land. The 
court overturned a jury verdict of $500014 and limited recovery 
to the difference in market value, rejecting the plaintiffs' claim 
to the cost of performance. The Peevyhouse case represents the 
majority rule. A minority case involving similar facts, Groves v. 
12. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 55. 
13. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962). 
14. Id. at 114. The composition of the damages was not specified in the opinion, and 
the award exceeded the potential market value of the land had the defendant performed. 
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John Wunder Co., us which awarded the promisor's cost of per-
formance of $60,000 although the market value of the land was 
only $12,000, has been widely criticized. Yet, in both cases, the 
plaintiffs' subjective valuation of the promise may well have ex-
ceeded the supposedly objective measure provided by market 
value. 
It is worth noting at this point that courts and commentators 
might well (and sometimes do) conflate the standard expectation 
theory with its missing promisor-based version, just as Fuller 
and Perdue conflate reliance and restitution. The reason that 
Peeuyhouse is widely cited and taught is because it is not always 
clear whether a promisee's expectation is restricted to his own 
gains from performance or whether he has an interest in having 
the promisor do what she promised. In the land-restoration 
cases, the courts have tended to reject the latter interest under 
the specter of imminent and substantial economic waste. In 
other cases, notably those awarding the equitable remedy of spe-
cific performance, the rhetoric of promisor-based justifications is 
more common. 
Let me denote the missing remedy, that imposed in Groves u. 
Wunder, as "liquidated specific performance" (LSP): liquidated 
because it takes the form of money, and specific performance 
because, like specific performance it puts the promisor at the 
welfare level she would have enjoyed had she performed.16 At 
least in this last sense, LSP is not punitive, notwithstanding 
dicta of the Peeuyhouse court and of some commentators. Ex-
plicit recognition of LSP and of the framework of Figure 1 helps 
us to generalize the insights of Fuller and Perdue and to relate 
those insights to those of the law and economics literature. 
II. ACCOUNTING RELATIONSHIPS LINKING THE FOUR DAMAGE 
THEORIES 
The major theoretical significance of Fuller and Perdue's arti-
cle was that it clarified the relationship between the reliance 
principle and its competitors in a way that made the reliance 
principle fundamental yet still explained the expectation inter-
est's doctrinal predominance. Fuller and Perdue's explanation, 
15. 205 Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235 (1939). 
16. Admittedly, the LSP term could be applied to the lower left-hand cell of Figure 1 
with equal logic, but because the expectation term is so entrenched in that usage, I see 
little risk of confusion in my terminology. Another possibility would be promisor's 
expectation. 
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interestingly enough, depends on simple accounting identities 
and tracks closely the distinction between accounting and eco-
nomic profit found in all economics principles textbooks. 
An accounting identity is an arithmetic equation that identi-
fies two alternative methods for dividing up a sum into its parts. 
To tak~ an example from national income accounting, gross na-
tional product can be thought of either as the sum of different 
types of expenditures (i.e., consumption, gross investment, gov-
ernment spending, and net imports) or as the sum of different 
types of payments to factors of production (i.e., wages, interest, 
rent, and profits). This is because each dollar's worth of trade in 
the economy can be accounted for either from the point of view 
of the person spending the dollar or from the point of view of 
the person receiving the dollar. Although accounting identities 
are tautologies, their practical significance is that each method 
of calculation serves as an independent check on errors made 
using the other. For example, if one wanted to verify one's direct 
measurement of gross investment, one could add up wages, rent, 
interest, and profits, and then subtract the total of consumption, 
government spending, and net imports. Indeed, a look at the sta-
tistical tables published yearly by the Department of Com-
merce's Bureau of Economic Analysis will reveal a category de-
noted "Statistical Discrepancy." This figure, the value of which 
was reported in 1986 at $5.4 billion (or 0.15% of total GNP), 
reflects the extent to which the alternative methods of adding 
up national income cannot be reconciled.17 
A simple accounting of the gains and losses from an individual 
contract similarly reveals a number of accounting identities re-
lating the four damage principles. Let me introduce some simple 
notation. We can divide amounts of value based on whether they 
are paid out or received by each of the parties. I will denote 
amounts spent by either party by the letter C, for cost, and 
amounts received by either party by the letter V, for value. Also, 
let the letters p and d in subscript denote amounts spent or re-
ceived by the promisee (the mnemonic is plaintiff) and the 
promisor (defendant), respectively. For example, Cp stands for 
the total amount spent by the promisee-plaintiff. 
Let us also classify payments based on the point of time when 
they were or are to be made, with the dividing line being the 
17. See, e.g., ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 258 (1988). I am told informally 
that a large preliminary figure for this category provides the occasion for consternation 
in the halls of the Commerce Department, followed by additional staff meetings and 
frantic bouts of recalculation. 
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instant when the promisor considers whether to breach (or when 
the promisor actually does breach). Call the time period up until 
the promisor's breach decision period zero, and call the period 
after the breach decision period one. Subscripts O and 1 denote 
amounts spent or received in periods zero and one. For example, 
VpO denotes the total amount received by the promisee under 
the contract until the moment of breach: This amount of course 
could be zero. The amount spent by one side may or may not be 
equal to the amount received by the other, although for con-
tracts for the payment of money they will be roughly the same 
(excluding transaction costs). For instance, if the only activity 
up to the moment of breach is payment of cash by the promisee, 
then CpO = VdO. If the promisee makes additional reliance in-
vestments not benefiting the promisor, then CpO will exceed 
VdO. In general, however, the amounts spent by one party will 
be positively related to the amount received by the other. 
Figure 2 
Vo Vpo + Vdo Co Cpo + Cdo 
+ + + + + + 
V1 Vpl + Vdl C1 Cpl + Cdl 
V VP + Vd C Cp + Cd 
Figure 2 summarizes the basic notation. The equations can be 
read both horizontally and vertically. VO is the total amount of 
value received by both parties before the breach decision; V 1, 
Co, and Cl are similarly defined. Likewise, Vp is the total 
amount of value received by the plaintiff-promisee over both pe-
riods of time, and so on. The unsubscripted V and C are the 
total value and costs of the contract, summed over both periods 
and parties. 
There is just one more bit of notation needed to begin the 
accounting; let N denote the net profit for any period or 
party-the difference between V and C. The idealized damage 
measures can then be identified in terms of the various compo-
nents of V, C, and N. The backward-looking measures, reliance 
and restitution, require us to return the party in focus back to 
the position before the contract. This means that the party must 
either return period one profits if they are positive or receive 
compensation in the same amount if they are negative. The for-
ward-looking measures, expectation and LSP, require measures 
550 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:4 
based on period one profits. Finally, let us denote damages paya-
ble by D, with subscripts r, n, x, and L respectively denoting 
reliance, restitution, expectation, and LSP. Formally: 
(1) Reliance damages - Dr - -Vpo + Cpo - -Npo 
(2) Restitution damages - Dn - Vdo Cdo - Ndo 
(3) Expectation damages - Dx Vpl Cpl - Npl 
(4) LSP damages - DL - -Vdl + Cdl -Ndl 
These definitions are idealized, and I am not claiming that 
courts always apply them in practice. Note that what I call resti-
tution includes only the net value received by the promisor 
before breach. This means that a promisor in breach can deduct 
her expenditures in partial performance as a setoff from any 
gross value received. There might be cases, of course, in which 
courts invoke restitution theory and require the promisor to pay 
not just Ndo but V dO· Alternatively, a court might take seriously 
the doctrinal requirement that amounts in restitution actually 
flow from the promisee, and require the promisor to pay the 
lesser of Cpo or V dO· Such decisions may put the promisor in a 
worse position than the one in which she started and may well 
be better understood on reliance grounds. This will be discussed 
further below. 
The accounting identities relating the damage measures can 
be found by adding and subtracting pairs of equations (1) 
through (4): 
(5) Dx Dr - Npo + Npl - Np 
(6) Dn Dr - Npo + Ndo - No 
(7) Dn DL - Ndo + Ndl - Nd 
(8) Dx DL - Npl + Ndl N1 
The four identities expressed by equations (5) - (8) are symmet-
ric. The difference within each pair of party-based measures, 
restitution-LSP for the defendant and reliance-expectation for 
the plaintiff, is just the combined net profits for each respective 
party. And similarly, the difference within each pair of time-
based measures, expectation-LSP for period 1 and reliance-resti-
tution for period 2, is the combined net profits for each respec-
tive period. 
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Equation (5) represents a familiar identity that Fuller and 
Perdue discuss at length, although obviously they do not use for-
mal symbolic analysis in doing so. Nonetheless, the interpreta-
tion of this identity takes up much of the first half of their arti-
cle. The difference between expectation and reliance damages is 
just the promisee's net profits from the contract-the difference 
between where the promisee was before the contract and where 
he would have been after performance. 
This is how Fuller and Perdue explain their claim that courts 
can talk in terms of expectation while the reliance principle re-
mains fundamental. The courts are not really applying the ex-
pectation principle but instead are applying an expectation mea-
sure as an approximation. If the promisee's net profits from the 
transaction are close to zero, then the approximation will be a 
good one. Furthermore, the expectation measure may provide in 
practice a better approximation to the ideal reliance interest 
than does the reliance measure itself: 
[Expectation] offers the measure of recovery most likely 
to reimburse the plaintiff for the (often very numerous 
and very difficult to prove) individual acts and forbear-
ances which make up his total reliance on the contract. If 
we take into account "gains prevented" by reliance, that 
is, losses involved in foregoing the opportunity to enter 
other contracts, the notion that the rule protecting the 
expectancy is adopted as the most effective means of 
compensating for detrimental reliance seems not at all 
far-fetched. 18 
Another way of making the same point is to say that the 
promisee's net profits should be understood not as accounting 
profits (the difference between the profits earned in this con-
tract versus doing nothing at all), but as economic profits (the 
difference between the profits earned in this contract versus 
those available in the next best alternative project, which he 
would have begun but for the defendant's promise). In the 
jargon of economists, firms doing business in competitive mar-
kets tend over time to earn zero economic profits. This is be-
cause free entry and exit of firms and capital flows between dif-
ferent industries will equalize rates of accounting profit 
throughout the economy. In the long run, it is no better to be in 
one industry than in any other, unless one is lucky enough to 
18. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 60. 
552 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:4 
own some productive input specially suited to a particular pur-
pose, such as rich farmland or a unique talent for hitting base-
balls.19 When one counts lost opportunities as a form of reliance, 
as Fuller and Perdue argued, the expectation measure becomes a 
very good approximation indeed. 20 
Moreover, according to Fuller and Perdue, this approach ex-
plains why expectation damages are generally not available fol-
lowing the breach of a gratuitous promise. Because the transac-
tion between promisor and promisee was a gift rather than an 
exchange, the promisee is likely to earn substantial economic 
profit from it. Accepting a gift from the promisor will not gener-
ally require the promisee to forego a similar gift from another 
benefactor. Accordingly, using the expectation measure risks 
substantially overestimating the reliance interest. 21 
The risk of overestimation does not mean that the expectation 
measure should never be used in such cases, because if it is very 
difficult to measure actual reliance, the expectation measure 
may still be the best approximation. Such a situation can be il-
lustrated by a nontraditional reading of Hamer v. Sidway,22 in 
which an uncle promised his fifteen-year-old nephew a sum of 
$5000 if the nephew abstained from tobacco, alcohol, gambling, 
and profanity until his twenty-first birthday. The court upheld 
the clean-living nephew's claim of the $5000 against the uncle's 
executor on a bargain theory, notwithstanding a factual record 
indicating primarily donative intent on the uncle's part. As a re-
sult, many students come away from Hamer v. Sidway with the 
lesson that consideration is defined by the relinquishing of a le-
19. Even in that case, the opportunity to sell the unique input to someone else means 
there is an implicit cost to the owner in not doing so, and that cost must be subtracted to 
calculate economic profit. Since prospective purchasers would be willing to pay up to the 
present value of the unique asset's profit stream in order to get it, long-run economic 
profits will still be zero if asset markets are competitive. Assets that cannot be sold, such 
as personal talents, can earn positive economic profits in long-run competition. 
20. See Cooter & Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1432, 
1434 (1985) (arguing, inter alia, that "[u]nder certain conditions, reliance and expecta-
tion damages will be virtually identical," and that "[i]n most cases, the major variables 
that determine the best method for measuring expectation damages are market structure 
and business conduct."). Cooter and Eisenberg also develop a number of accounting for-
mulas useful in calculating expectation damages in a number of contexts. See also the 
lucid discussion of formulas for calculating damages in E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 
§§ 12.9-.12 (1982). 
21. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 64-65 ("The suggestion that the expecta-
tion interest is adopted as a kind of surrogate for the reliance interest because of the 
difficulty of proving reliance can scarcely be applicable to a situation where we actually 
insist on proof of reliance, and indeed, reliance of a 'definite and substantial 
character.'"). 
22. 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891). 
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gal right. An alternative interpretation is that there was no con-
sideration, but the difficulty of measuring the value of the 
nephew's uncommon forbearance made expectation damages the 
best feasible way to protect his reliance interest. 
On similar reasoning, equation (6) demonstrates how a restitu-
tion measure can be used to approximate the reliance interest. 
The difference between the two is No, the combined net profit of 
both parties before breach. If the only events preceding breach 
involve the payment of money or the transfer of goods in a way 
that does not preclude their return, combined net profit is nec-
essarily zero, and reliance and restitution are identical in 
amount. More generally, if the activities of the parties prior to 
breach do not require substantial irretrievable outlays, the ap-
proximation will still be a good one. If, as is often the case, the 
promisee's reliance expenditures exceed the value received by 
the promisor, restitution damages will be inadequate to protect 
the reliance interest. Some unreflective courts faced with such 
cases have awarded reliance damages and called it restitution. 
For example, in Vickery v. Ritchie,23 a dishonest architect 
tricked the parties into agreeing to the uneconomical construc-
tion of a Turkish bathhouse by changing the price written in the 
contract. The plaintiff spent $33,000 building the structure; the 
increase in the value of the defendant's land was $22,000; the 
contract price was $23,000. The architect had skipped town. The 
court awarded damages of $33,000 on a theory of quasi-contract. 
Such cases support the Fuller and Perdue thesis that reliance is 
the more fundamental interest. 
One could also take advantage of equation (7) to use LSP as 
an approximation to restitution. The approximation will be good 
if Nd, the defendant's net profit from the contract, is not too 
large. This approach may well have motivated the Minnesota 
court in Groves v. Wunder. It may be very difficult to discover 
the amount by which a breaching promisor has been unjustly 
enriched. If we assume that the transaction was a break-even 
one for her ex ante, the promisor's expenses of completion will 
roughly equal her first-period profit. If the contract were a losing 
one (which may explain why she breached), the LSP measure 
exceeds the restitution interest. Nonetheless, the Groves court 
may have pref erred to err on the side of overly high damages in 
order to ensure full disgorgement. Such an approach may seem 
23. 202 Mass. 247, 88 N.E. 835 (1909). 
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especially attractive when breach appears deliberate or in bad 
faith. 2' 
Finally, equation (8) shows that the LSP measure can provide 
an approximation to the expectation interest. The difference be-
tween LSP and expectation is equal to N 1, or the combined net 
profit from performance. The value of N 1 is important for an-
other reason as well: it indicates whether or not the promisor's 
breach was efficient. If N 1 is positive, it would have been socially 
desirable for the defendant to perform; any losses on her part 
would have been outweighed by the plaintiff's gains. In this case, 
LSP underestimates the expectation interest. Conversely, if Ni 
is negative, so that breach is efficient, LSP will overcompensate 
the promisee relative to expectation. It was apparently this risk 
of overcompensation that made the Peevyhouse court reluctant 
to grant LSP, because substantial economic waste means the ap-
proximation is poor. In many situations, however, the promisee's 
expectation is subjective and difficult to measure. Indeed, this 
seemed to be the case in Peevyhouse, where the plaintiffs explic-
itly bargained with the defendant for restoration of their land in 
circumstances where they had every reason to know that the 
market value of doing so was nil. If the efficiency of breach is 
not overwhelming, the LSP measure may be a workable alterna-
tive to attempting to value subjective expectations. 
It is also possible to derive additional accounting identities by 
adding and subtracting pairs of equations (5) through (8). These 
identities suggest additional approximations to the four damage 
measures. The difference between LSP and reliance, for in-
stance, is equal to No - Nd, or equivalently, to Np - N1. De-
pending upon the details of the transaction, LSP could be a 
good approximation for reliance and could be an even better ap-
proximation than either restitution or expectation. In general, 
though Fuller and Perdue focus on the expectation measure as 
an approximation to the reliance interest, any of the four mea-
sures could be used to approximate any of the four interests 
more or less precisely depending on the circumstances. The ac-
counting relationships are perfectly symmetric. A court's use of 
the reliance measure and even a bit of reliance rhetoric, then, 
does not in itself imply any rejection of the expectation, restitu-
tion, or even the LSP interests. 
24. See, e.g., H.P. Droher & Sons v. Toushin, 250 Minn. 490, 85 N.W.2d 273 (1957), 
(distinguishing Groves and declining to award LSP damages on the grounds that the 
promisor's breach had been in good faith). 
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A leading case that illustrates the point is Security Stove and 
Manufacturing Co. v. American Railway Express Co. 26 In Se-
curity Stove, plaintiff stove company was deprived by defend-
ant's breach of the uncertain goodwill and promotional value of 
exhibiting its model stove at a trade convention. The court dis-
cussed the difficulty of measuring the expectation interest: 
There is no contention that the exhibit would have been 
entirely valueless and whatever it might have accom-
plished defendant knew of the circumstances . . . . In 
cases of this kind the method of estimating damages 
should be adopted which is the most definite and certain 
and which best achieves the fundamental purpose of 
compensation. 26 
The plaintiff accordingly recovered its costs of preparing for and 
attending the convention. 
Similarly, in L. Albert and Son v. Armstrong Rubber,27 Judge 
Learned Hand allowed a buyer to recover reliance damages but 
held that the seller could deduct from the recovery any losses it 
could prove the buyer would have had on the contract. (In the 
notation of the previous section, such losses correspond to a neg-
ative value for Np in equation (5), so that reliance minus losses 
equals expectation). What made the L. Albert case especially in-
teresting is that Judge Hand explicitly recognized the distinction 
between theory and measurement, and allocated the evidentiary 
burdens to make the measure as precise as possible. Hand made 
it clear, however, that when full information is available regard-
ing both the reliance and expectation interests, the expectation 
interest should be protected. Indeed, he cited Fuller and Perdue 
in support of that conclusion: "We will not in a suit for reim-
bursement of losses incurred in reliance on a contract knowingly 
put the plaintiff in a better position than he would have occu-
pied had the contract been fully performed. "28 
A second line of cases-those awarding precontractual reli-
ance-further illustrates the possible variations on this point. 
Precontractual reliance includes expenditures made by the 
promisee in anticipation of a bargain, either with the promisor 
or with someone else, but before any promise has been made. In 
principle, such expenditures could not have been a consequence 
25. 227 Mo. App. 175, 51 S.W.2d 572 (1932). 
26. Id. at 184, 51 S.W.2d at 577. 
27. 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949). 
28. Id. at 191. 
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of the subsequent promise and as such are not truly part of the 
reliance interest. 29 Several courts have accordingly denied recov-
ery for such expenditures.30 But others, such as the English 
Court of Appeals in Anglia Television v. Reed, 31 have awarded 
precontractual reliance on the grounds that the defendant's 
breach, while not inducing the plaintiff's expenditures, caused 
them to be wasted. This reasoning seems to assume that, were 
the precontractual reliance expenses not wasted, they would 
have produced some expectation value not otherwise measura-
ble. If we assume that the project would have earned a normal 
return, the sum of postcontractual and precontractual reliance 
damages will help approximate the expectation. We can carry 
this reasoning one step further by observing that precontractual 
reliance could also be used to approximate postcontractual reli-
ance through repeated applications of equation (8). Had Anglia 
Television not contracted with Reed, it might have contracted 
with another actor who would not have breached, allowing them 
to earn the profits from completing the film. To compensate the 
producer for its probable lost opportunity to contract with an-
other actor who would not have breached, it was necessary to 
use the expectation profits that would have been earned by do-
ing so. In order to approximate the expectation measure it was 
necessary to use precontractual reliance because such profits 
were too uncertain to admit of any direct calculation. 
Ill. CONCLUSION: CHOOSING AMONG THE FOUR DAMAGE 
PRINCIPLES 
It should now be plain that although accounting relationships 
explain how courts can talk about one damage measure while 
"really" implementing another, they do not by themselves give 
us any information about which interest is the theoretically cor-
rect one. Let us suppose momentarily that we are free to ignore 
difficulties of measurement. Which of the four interests is most 
29. I ignore the possibility that such expenditures could reasonably have been made 
in reliance on some prior conduct or informal promise of the promisor during prelimi-
nary negotiation. In that case, there is no difficulty classifying precontractual reliance as 
true reliance, provided that the court is willing to attach liability to informal promises. 
See. e.g., Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 
26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). 
30. See, e.g., Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542 (1932). 
31. 3 All E.R. 690 (C.A. 1971). In this case, the defendant actor's breach caused the 
cancellation of filming on a made-for-television movie. Calculating the profits the movie 
would have made would clearly have been difficult under the circumstances. 
SUMMER 1988] Reliance Interest 557 
fundamental or best justified? Fuller and Perdue believed it to 
be the reliance interest: 
It may be said that there is not only a policy in favor of 
preventing and undoing the harms resulting from reli-
ance, but also a policy in favor of promoting and facilitat-
ing reliance on business agreements. As in the case of the 
stop-light ordinance we are interested not only in 
preventing collisions but in speeding traffic. Agreements 
can accomplish little, either for their makers or for soci-
ety, unless they are made the basis for action.32 
Although the importance of protecting reliance, both for utili-
tarian purposes and on grounds of corrective justice, may argue 
in favor of an expectation measure, for Fuller and Perdue such 
arguments were purely instrumental. 
The difficulties in proving reliance and subjecting it to 
pecuniary measurement are such that the business man 
knowing, or sensing, that these obstacles stood in the way 
of judicial relief would hesitate to rely on a promise in 
any case where the legal sanction was of significance to 
him. To encourage reliance we must therefore dispense 
with its proof.33 
On the other hand, it is possible to construct other normative 
theories of contract liability that place primary emphasis on one 
of the other damage interests or that find different interests to 
be paramount in different situations. The efficiency criterion ad-
vanced by many law and economics scholars is one such exam-
ple. Much of the modern conventional wisdom of law and eco-
nomics on the subject of contract remedies can be traced back to 
arguments suggested by Fuller and Perdue. One might expect, 
therefore, that the law and economics literature on contracts, 
with its emphasis on individual maximizing behavior and its 
utilitarian approach to social value, would reach similar conclu-
sions. Yet the law and economics literature has so far declined to 
incorporate Fuller and Perdue's principal theme-the primacy 
of the reliance interest and the importance of protecting it. In-
stead, the problem of protecting reliance has received relatively 
little attention from those who have written on the economics of 
32. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 61. 
33. Id. at 62. 
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contract remedies. 34 The conventional law and economics wis-
dom, in contrast, is that optimal contract damages protect the 
reliance interest only incidentally. In terms of allocative effi-
ciency, rather, both reliance and expectation damages overpro-
tect those who rely. 311 Although this is not the appropriate forum 
for a full explanation, a brief sketch is possible. 36 
The typical approach of law and economics to contract dam-
ages is to evaluate the standard damage measures on the crite-
rion of efficiency; that is, to inquire which of the measures maxi-
mizes the sum of social benefits less social costs.37 There are at 
least three aspects of efficiency that relate to contract damages: 
efficiency of performance, efficiency of reliance, and efficiency in 
risk bearing. In order for a damage rule to be efficient with re-
gard to performance, it must induce the promisor to perform her 
promise when her cost of performance is less than or equal to 
the promisee's gain from performance, and to breach other-
34. In contrast, the reliance interest has received substantial attention in the related 
literature on why and whether contracts should be enforced at all. One notable illustra-
tion of this latter category is Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the 
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980); see also Posner, Gratuitous Promises in 
Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977). The gap between economic writings on 
contract enforcement and on remedies for breach is notable in this regard. 
35. I am not going to discuss here the litany of assumptions, qualifications, and dis-
claimers necessary for the analysis to which I refer. That is beyond the scope of this 
essay. Nor do I want to defend the economic approach as a valid methodology. For a 
good discussion of the basic assumptions of the economic approach, see G. BECKER, THE 
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3-14 (1976); for a briefer introduction, see A 
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983). For clarity's sake, I note that 
the results I mention below proceed on the unrealistic but usefully simplifying assump-
tions that (1) the rules and remedies of contract law provide the primary external con-
straints on contracting parties' behavior, and relatedly, (2) the Coase theorem does not 
hold, so that bargaining and renegotiation after the making of the original contract will 
not suffice to induce the parties to behave efficiently. Obviously, renegotiation and other 
social constraints supplement the rules of contract law in protecting reliance and other 
economic values, and the discussion below should be understood as pertaining to situa-
tions in which other efficiency-promoting institutions fail. 
36. For the standard exposition of this analysis in nontechnical form, see A. POLIN-
SKY, supra note 37; R. CooTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 212-47 (1988). For rigor-
ous technical expositions, see Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Rem-
edies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983); Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures 
for Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 39 (1984); Shaven, Damage Measures for 
Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 466 (1980); and Shavell, The Design of Contracts 
and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 121 (1984). 
37. The performance of any legal rule, of course, depends upon individuals' reactions 
to it, and law and economics assumes that parties to a contract behave in such a way as 
to maximize their self-interests subject to the constraints imposed upon them by rules of 
law. Different damage rules imply different constraints and thus imply different reac-
tions by maximizing individuals. 
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wise. 38 For a damage rule to be efficient with regard to reliance, 
it must induce the promisee to make reliance investments when 
the social value of those investments exceeds their cost, and not 
otherwise. Finally, for a damage rule to be efficient with regard 
to risk bearing, it should arrange for damages following breach 
to mimic the optimal insurance policy covering the risk of 
breach that the promisee would buy from the promisor in a per-
fect market. 
According to standard law and economics analysis, protecting 
the reliance interest is not efficient with respect to either per-
formance or reliance. Expectation damages ensure efficient per-
formance; because the promisor must pay in damages the prom-
isee's value of performance, she correctly trades off that value 
against her own cost of performance. To the extent that reliance 
diverges from expectation, reliance damages can induce either 
excessive breach or excessive performance. 
Both expectation damages and reliance . damages encourage 
inefficient overreliance. Because both rules provide full insur-
ance against lost reliance, they give a promisee the incentive to 
undertake all reliance investments which earn a profit in the un-
certain event of performance. This is socially inefficient, how-
ever, because there may be a significant chance that the prom-
isor will be unable to perform (or that it will be inefficient for 
her to do so) and the reliance investment will be wasted. Both 
reliance and expectation damages make the promisee indifferent 
to the possibility of wasteful reliance. The efficient level of reli-
ance occurs when a promisee undertakes all investments costing 
less than their discounted value, where the discount reflects the 
chances that performance will not turn out to be worthwhile. 39 
Finally, depending on the circumstances, any of the four dam-
age theories could promote efficient risk bearing. If the promisee 
wishes to avoid all risk and the promisor is willing to accept risk 
with no compensation, expectation damages are efficient because 
they fully insure the promisee against losses from breach. Con-
versely, if the promisor receives great disutility from risk and 
the promisee is relatively indifferent to it, it may be efficient to 
38. Alternatively, the damage rule must induce the promisor to take precautions to 
ensure performance when and only when the cost of precaution is less than the expected 
benefit to the promisee in terms of increased benefits from performance. 
39. If the promisee treats a socially risky investment as one that is guaranteed, he 
will overinvest in it relative to the wealth-maximizing level. Consider the behavior of a 
person deciding whether to build a valuable structure on a floodplain. From the social 
point of view, it is better that such structures be built elsewhere unless the advantage of 
building in this particular location is great; if the owner is fully insured, however, the 
most trivial locational advantage will induce him to build on the floodplain. 
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set damages at the promisor's expected cost of performance and 
to provide an appropriate adjustment in the contract price. If 
the two parties are equally averse to risk, it may be optimal to 
split the difference and agree to some intermediate level of liqui-
dated damages. 
The point is not that standard law and economics analysis 
reveals Fuller and Perdue to be wrong in their normative claims 
regarding the reliance interest.40 Rather, anyone who develops a 
competing normative theory can use the same type of descrip-
tive analysis to argue that the new theory is really "true." Be-
cause the distinction between measure and motive can cut in all 
four directions, in their tour de force Fuller and Perdue planted 
the seeds for their own revisionists. Whether a revisionist cri-
tique will succeed depends on the abstract force of the norma-
tive arguments mustered in its favor and on the ability of its 
proponents to find language in common law cases, statutes, and 
other legal materials that supports their theory. 
I personally do not expect a fully convincing normative justifi-
cation for the reliance interest, or, for that matter, any of the 
other interests. We are and should be moved by the perspective 
of both the promisor and the promisee, and the correct result in 
any given case will depend upon how we organize our percep-
tions. Similarly, both forward-looking and backward-looking 
perspectives have some appeal in concrete situations. In any 
event, unless and until such a justification is developed, it will 
be possible in a typical breach of contract case to make two dis-
tinct sorts of arguments regarding the damages payable. The 
first argument will be one of theory: which of the four theories 
or variations thereon best fulfills our conceptions of justice? The 
second argument is one of measurement: which of the four mea-
sures or variations thereon best implements our ideal theory? 
Both arguments are instrumental, although the second argument 
may seem more obviously so. Nonetheless, it is useful for both 
lawyers and legal scholars to make the distinction. Our dialogue 
will be clearer if we know whether we are arguing about means 
or ends. 
40. The overreliance argument of law and economics, in particular, depends upon at 
least two assumptions: (1) that courts are unable to recognize excessive reliance and dis-
allow it as an item of damages, and (2) that promisees are better placed than promisors 
to take precautions against overreliance. 
